After reading through the headlines and articles this morning, there is no shortage of explanations of why Martha Coakley lost the race for U.S. Senate to Republican Scott Brown.  Here are three reasons why I believe Coakley lost:

1. Coakley became the “rubber stamp” candidate.

The race became a race of the status quo vs. change. Martha Coakley failed to convince voters that she would be anything more than a rubber stamp for the Democrats down in Washington. While she probably would have voted with the Democrats on virtually every issue anyways, she didn’t do enough to explain what she would do differently, or what efforts she would try to champion while serving Massachusetts. On the health care reform issue, she didn’t say how she would impact the bill’s negotiations in the Senate. She was simply arguing that there should be reform, and President Obama’s plan should be passed.

On the economic issues, the perception was also that she was going to be a rubber stamp for the Democrats. She became a candidate that stood for higher taxes, big government, and massive spending. More importantly, however, she let her opponent define her in this way.

People were frustrated and they didn’t see Martha Coakley as a person who would stand for them. They saw Martha Coakley as a fixture of the Democratic establishment in Massachusetts.

Scott Brown, on the other hand, made frequent stops all around the commonwealth – especially in western Massachusetts – and came to the table saying what he would change, and why it would be better than the status quo. He listened to the voters and was able to keep both party activists, the tea party activists, and a majority of independents in his coalition. Brown ran as a moderate, mainstream, person who would listen to the voters. He did not brand himself as a person who would be a rubber stamp for the “party of no,” and Coakley’s attempts to do so came too late in the game. Even on the health care issue, he made it clear that he would vote against it (as it stands now) because he felt it would be best for Massachusetts and what the voters want, not because he wants to be rubber stamp for the GOP. And he made an argument for tax cuts, and did so while integrating a key Kennedy figure, JFK, in the process – again, a politically brilliant move for an electorate that is the home turf for the Kennedy legacy.

2. Coakley was not a natural politician, nor a commoner.

While in Springfield, Massachusetts I had the pleasure of attending one of Coakley’s rallies on MLK Jr. Day, the day before election day. From her speech and demeanor at this event, and from the more distant observations made from her coverage in the media, it was clear Coakley is not cut out to be a politician. She didn’t have much charisma, and there were moments where it seemed as though she was trying too hard. Her gestures seemed rehearsed, awkward, and artificial. Here is one example.

On the flip side, she also wasn’t a commoner. Scott Brown was the commoner, the everyday man. He was the one with the pickup truck, the picture-perfect family, the personality and charisma. She was not. He was cool, she was not. Coakley was branded as out-of-touch with voters, which was manifested in a superficial, yet telling example of when she called Curt Schilling a Yankees fan. The transition from the discussion about Former NYC Mayor Rudy Giuliani coming to Massachusetts to him being a Yankees fan, seemed rehearsed and out-of-place for Coakley. It was a failed attempt to increase her “likability” rating.

Coakley could have branded herself as a commoner. She grew up in western Massachusetts and served the public for decades. She could have exposed her experiences living in the country, her family, and culture to the voters. She could have put up commercials about what type of a person she was and how her roots impact her perspective. She attempted to integrate some of this into her speeches towards the final days of the campaign, but at that point it was too late, once again. Brown was able to brand her as a relatively out-of-touch politician, and she consistently gave him fresh material to work with.

3. Coakley ran a terrible, terrible campaign.

From a substance perspective, the Coakley Campaign was a train wreck. As shown above, she allowed herself to be branded as a rubber stamp for the Democrats and an out-of-touch politician. These are not uncommon charges by the opposing candidate – we see them all the time – but the Coakley Campaign was so inept at responding that the charges became the reality, the truth. They did little to change the narrative of the campaign, and allowed her 30 point lead to wither as an aggressive and relatively well-organized campaign took advantage.

Although obvious now, Coakley took too much for granted. She was ahead in a state that is one of the most Democratic in the country, a state that voted for Barack Obama by an almost 2-1 margin, and a state where Democrats outnumber Republicans by a near 3-1 ratio. She didn’t do the type of campaign work that is necessary in most elections, let alone for a special election where turnout is the key to success. She even took time off the campaign trail during the holidays – while Scott Brown was pushing ahead. Coakley and her campaign team made a critical miscalculation.

Her campaign had little infrastructure across the commonwealth. While on the ground I spoke with volunteers who said as little as a week and a half ago the idea of making phone calls and going door-to-door was a foreign concept to the campaign. I heard account after account of people who were looking to lend a helping hand, but didn’t have a place to do it, or a person to talk to. The office I was working out of in the 36  hours prior to election day was run by DNC and Organizing for America (Obama’s political arm) staff. The majority of the people in the office were out-of-state people. The Vermont Director for OFA said before he arrived in Springfield on Saturday, only 200 doors had been knocked. Springfield is a city with over 150,000 residents. The last-ditch effort came too late.

There seemed to be no shortage of volunteers attempting to save the Coakley Campaign, but the lack of infrastructure and coordination made the efforts less effective. While making phone calls to voters, residents of Massachusetts were getting called 5,6, even 10 times within a 72 hour period. The way the campaign tracked supporters and its door-to-door operations was also disorganized and relatively weak. As opposed to having the traditional “1 – Strong supporter; 2 – Supporter; 3 – Undecided; 4 – Brown; 5 – Strong Brown” system for identifying voters, the system had classifications such as “Will vote, bring others; Will vote; Not a Coakley supporter” among a series of five other options.

From an advertising perspective, Coakley did little in the way of advertising before the last week or so. Her literature was poorly done. One piece of literature I saw attempted to do a caricature of Brown based on the “What could Brown do for you?” advertisements of UPS. It was distasteful and poorly designed, and her election-day palm cards, altough not as embarrassing, were not tremendously effective. Coakley didn’t even go up with TV commercials before the last week of the campaign. According to Coakley’s YouTube channel, her first TV ad was on January 11th – way too late in the game.

The GOTV operation of the campaign was like trying to build a building on a poor foundation – people from all over the country descended upon Massachusetts in an effort to save the race, but the lack of coordination, preexisting structure, and a failed campaign strategy all proved to be insurmountable in such a short time frame.

A debate is raging about where we go from here, but we know one thing for sure: don’t take any race for granted and listen to the voters. I like Martha Coakley. I think she could have been a great Senator, but her campaign is a prime example of why people shouldn’t sleep through political science 101.